Over the past decade, in part of Ghana's Eastern region, an established system of maize and cassava intercropping for sale to urban consumers has begun to be replaced by intensive
production of pineapple for export to European markets. An important component of this transformation is the adoption of agricultural chemicals that were not used in the previous farming system. In this paper, we consider how farmers in this area might learn about the appropriate use of fertilizer in this new farming system.
A survey was conducted of approximately 450 individuals in four clusters of villages in
Ghana's Eastern Region over a period of 21 months in 1996-1998. 1 Two aspects of the data are relevant here. First, plot level data on inputs and outputs was collected at frequent intervals from the respondents. Second, a variety of data on farmer interactions was collected.
For example, data was collected on respondents' knowledge of inputs and outputs on the plots of other respondents and on respondents' conversations about farming (and speciÞcally about fertilizer) with other farmers. These data provide direct evidence regarding the assumptions that underlie the canonical model of social learning in village settings.
It does not appear to be the case that farmers learn from all other farmers in their village. Each respondent was matched randomly with 10 other farmers in his/her village.
In only 11 percent of these matches had one of the two individuals ever received advice about farming from the other. In 30 percent of the matches, the respondent indicates that he could approach the other farmer for advice about fertilizer. is not always perfect: farmers are more likely to know broad facts (e.g., the other farmer had a particularly good harvest) rather than speciÞc details. Our purpose in the remainder of this paper is to examine some of the implications for optimal learning behavior when (a) information is incomplete and (b) ßows through networks.
Examples of Social Learning
This section describes a simple model of learning about optimal inputs. The basic form of this model is that farmers know the production technology up to the distribution of an optimal or target input. Suppose that each farmer has the following technology and that each operates it on one plot, for simplicity in notation. On farmer i's plot, a single input (fertilizer) f i,t is chosen at time t and the following period output q i,t+1 is produced. The amount of output is random because the ex post optimal level of the input is random, given by a 'target input' variable θ i,t+1 that for simplicity we take to be IID across agents and time.
We assume the loss associated with suboptimal inputs is quadratic:
Further suppose that the distribution of the target input shock is known by all farmers to be normally distributed with known variance V and unknown expected value m. So farmers have only the expected value of the target input shock, m, to learn.
The farmer's problem is to choose input f i.t given his beliefs. We model farmers as acting simultaneously in choosing f i.t so that others' choices are only observable in the following period. In this target input model, there are no strategic nor experimental motivations for a farmer to vary his use of inputs. Farmers are assumed to know the form of the production function, therefore the same information is revealed by any level of input use, so the optimal strategy is to choose f i,t to maximize proÞts. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that inputs are costless. The assumption of quadratic loss from having suboptimal inputs implies that the optimal choice of inputs is the expectation of θ with respect to his subjective prior distribution. So the optimal input choice in period 1 for farmer i is f i,1 = E i,1 (θ i,2 ).
In this note, we model farmers' beliefs about m in a Bayesian framework so that they have a subjective prior distribution over values of m and learning is identiÞed with updating these priors. We consider Þrst an example of a two-farmer village where both farmers are in direct communication with each other. We also suppose that each farmer observes without error the realization of θ for himself as well as his information neighbor. The second example illustrates the process of social learning when networks matter, that is, when not all farmers are in direct communication with each other. Finally, the last example illustrates the impact of limited observability on updating rules when all farmers directly communicate with each other.
Full Information
In example one, suppose there are two farmers A and B in communication with each other.
Assume that each farmer has full information ex post about his own and the other's realization of θ. It should be noted that the form of the production function implies that knowledge of inputs and outputs is not sufficient to deduce θ; it must also be the case that each farmer knows on which side of the optimal θ his fertilizer use fell. This is a general problem with production functions with an interior optimal input choice. Consider the optimal period 1 actions of farmers A and B after they update their beliefs with the information available to them after the Þrst period's θs are revealed. A updates his beliefs to:
Each farmer takes actions f i,1 and then observes outcomes θ i2 . A knows all the determinants of f B,1 with the exception of θ C1 ; hence as soon as A observes that B applies f B,1 , A can deduce what B must have learned from C, and hence the outcome of C's experiment in period 1. Therefore,
A and C, therefore, learn of each others' experiments (with a lag) through the impact of these experiments on the beliefs (and thus actions) of B.
If Farmer A were to use only the information contained in {θ A,1 , θ B,1 , θ A,2 , θ B,2 }, he would not have an optimal update of his beliefs because he would omit the information generated by θ C,1 . In general, when learning occurs through networks, observation of neighbors' optimal decisions contains a source of information that is not captured by their target input shock histories. Moreover, the particular history of realizations of θ now matters because farmer A must model farmer B's updating process in order to deduce farmer B's observation of θ C,1 . If the network structure were to be extended, for example by adding farmer D who communicates only with farmer C, farmer A would have to extend the depth of his memory in order to deduce θ D,1 and θ C,2 .
Limited Communication
We now consider how limited information will affect optimal learning behavior. For the sake of argument, consider two simple ways in which the realization of θ by one farmer may be imperfectly observable by other farmers. First, it may be observed with noise, so that the sum of θ plus an additive observation error is observed. Alternatively, only an indicator of the range of θ may be observed, for example that θ is above or below a certain value.
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In both cases we consider the simple network structure in which two farmers communicate with each other.
Suppose farmer A observes θ A,t perfectly but his observations of farmer B allow him only to recover θ B,t + u B,t where u B,t is independent measurement error with distribution N (0, P ). Farmer A will update his beliefs and take action f A,1 :
. This is similar to the updating rule in period 1 for the full information case, with the difference being that the information from neighbors is downweighted relative to the information available from one's own experiments. Farmer B's actions in period 1 are symmetric to those of farmer A.
Different forms of imperfect information can imply different updating rules. For example, suppose farmer A observes only whether θ B,t is larger or smaller than a known value θ * .
Suppose that in period 1 farmer A observes θ A,1 and that θ B,1 > θ * , the likelihood of this observation will have a density term for the θ A,1 information and a cumulative distribution term due to observation of the event θ B,1 > θ * . The resulting posterior mean does not to our knowledge have a closed form solution so we do not present it here. However, it is clear that it will result in a distinct likelihood and hence different posterior means and actions from the preceding case where θ B,1 is observed with an additive error.
In either case, farmer A can use farmer B's period 1 actions to deduce additional information about the distribution of θ. Returning to the additive error case, notice that f B,1 depends on θ B,1 measured without any error, and on θ A,1 + u A,1 , where u A,1 is independent of u B,1 . Therefore, in period 2, farmer B's previous action in period 1 will provide farmer A with more information than was contained in {θ A,2 , θ A,1 , θ B,2 + u B,2 , θ B,1 + u B,1 }. Similarly, in the case in which A observed only that θ B,1 > θ * , farmer B's action in period 1 depends upon a precisely observed θ B,1 and hence can provide farmer A with additional information about θ B,1. In each instance, farmer A (for example) can infer from B's actions some of the information that is directly available to B but not to A.
In the case of incomplete information, just as in the case of learning through networks discussed above, each farmer therefore Þnds it in his interest to infer additional information about the distribution of θ from the actions of the other farmer. In order to make this inference, each farmer must model the learning process of the other farmers with whom he communicates. 1 The dataset is described at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~cru2//ghanadata.html.
2 In this graph, we have deÞned information links based on farmers listed in each respondent's roster of individuals with whom he/she has had a signiÞcant conversations about farming.
3 In general, any target input model implies that the loss is observed, perhaps with error.
Knowledge of the loss generally provides the observer only with knowledge that the realized θ fell into a set. For example, if output was observed to be x, then θ must have been 
